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ABSTRACT
With the expansion of technology and the desire to downsize costs within the corporate culture,
the technology trend has steered towards the integration of personally owned mobile devices
(smartphones) within the corporate and enterprise environment. The movement, known as “Bring
Your Own Device” (hereinafter referred to as “BYOD”), seeks to eliminate the need for two
separate mobile devices for one employee. While taken at face value this trend seems favorable,
the corporate policy and legal implications of the implementation of BYOD are complicated by
significant investigatory issues that overshadow the benefits of utilizing BYOD. In this paper, we
set a context for the BYOD conundrum, then examine associated corporate policies, highlight the
limitations to the digital investigator’s reach regarding digital evidence and review the
investigatory challenges presented by BYOD. We conclude by offering recommendations such as
implementing proper policies/procedures, utilizing Mobile Device Management, corporate owned
devices, and enforcing agreements.
Keywords: Data, Employee, Policies, Device, Technology, Investigation, BYOD, BlackBag
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1. INTRODUCTION
Around the year of 1970, Intel Corporation Co-
Founder Gordon Moore predicted that the
processor speeds and power of computers
(based upon the number of transistors used in
chips) would double approximately every 24
months (Intel Corporation). This correct
prediction has encompassed standard
computers, laptops and mobile devices alike
including, but limited to, cellphones and
tablets. As clearly evidenced by Moore’s law
over the last 40 plus years, technology
continues to evolve at this spectacular rate.
Subsequently, policy, procedure and
regulations are often ill-conceived or not timely
enough to address the concerns that come with
society’s co-dependence on the latest
technology (and desire to use the latest
product). Further, any technological advances
to address regulatory and policy concerns are
often stymied by the slow progression of the
policy/regulatory reaction and the dynamic
evolution of technological advances.
Despite delays many policies and
regulations attempt to address some of the
latest developments and trends; however a
litany of other issues are created in the
process. One such issue is the use of personal
BYOD implementations in the corporate
environment instead of utilizing corporate
owned devices. The corporate environment is
making the BYOD shift due to the realized
cost savings; however, a comprehensive cost
benefit analysis must consider and account for
all of the regulatory/policy issues and
investigatory pitfalls that ultimately will arise
from the use of the personally owned
smartphones and other devices within
enterprise.
In this paper, the authors start with an
overview of technologies normally included
with the BYOD framework, and then move
into the advantages of disadvantages
organizations of BYOD initiatives. The authors
examine relevant prior implementations noting
benefits and drawbacks. In the next section,
relevant laws and their organization impact are
discussed, looking at established cases that
may set precedent that organizations should
consider along with some mitigation and
handling techniques for the digital forensic
examiner (hereinafter referred to as “DFE”) for
navigating in the realm of BYOD and
corporate structure. Following that section,
various mitigation techniques are discussed and
addresses including both technical and
administrative aspects.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the context of this research, “BYOD” refers
to a personal electronic device, mainly laptops,
tablets and smartphones that can be attached
to the corporate network and/or access
corporate resources. In previous years, BYOD
primarily focused upon cell phones (i.e., “dumb
phones”), USB thumb drives and USB Hard
Drives (such as removable storage drives). As
more of the workplace now focuses on the
evolved devices of the smartphone, tablets and
laptops, not much focus will be given to the
previous BYOD concerns. The author is not
stating that all of the previous BYOD concerns
are addressed by all companies these days, in
fact, many private companies allow USB and
other storage devices without any impunity
(most Governmental organizations prohibit by
policy and technical controls the access to
these devices). Lastly, some research will be
conducted in light up the new and upcoming
technology, such as smart watches, smart cars
and the like.
2.1 Interconnectedness
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As with most technology, there are tangible
benefits to be realized by an organization that
utilizes BYOD. For example, by having all
employees (or even a majority) connected to
the network and/or corporate resources via
BYOD, the side effect is having a more
connected workforce for telework/telecommute
and after-hours purposes. Further, cost savings
may be realized by the organization in the
absence of lease programs for the devices (via
associated fees), fewer device purchases
(hardware, less maintenance) and less IT
management overhead (Hinkes, 2014).
Traditionally, corporate enterprises would
allocate cell phones (i.e., Blackberrys) and
laptops for its employees to use during travel
and off-business time for his/her business
usage. Another definition of BYOD is “any
policy that allows workers to supply a platform
that they connect to work through” (DiMarco,
2013). Depending on the policy of the
organization, these devices are used by the
employee for combined business and personal
use or either strictly for business.  Without a
BYOD policy, an employee is generally in
possession of at least two devices—one for
business and one for personal usage.
2.2 Infrastructure
By utilizing BYOD, the company does not
have to install and maintain an infrastructure
for enterprise mobile solutions.  This decision
saves the company capital not only on the
physical resources but Information Technology
(“IT”) overhead resources as well. The realized
savings could be larger due to multiple
instances of BYOD utilization for smartphones
as well as tablets and/or laptops. By
leveraging the usage of the employee’s personal
tablet or laptop as well, the company would
realize hardware savings. It's important to note
that  the company will likely need to
contribute monetarily to the employee’s device
cost or resource usage, however that cost
would be a mere fraction of the upfront cost
for the large scale purchase of company owned
and maintained hardware. Moreover, there is
also a perception of reduced operating
expenditures in the total cost of ownership
(McGrath, 2014).
2.3 Technological Advancements and
Policies
When an employee uses his/her own devices,
he/she has access to more up-to-date
technology that, in turn, can benefit the
organization. When an employee, based upon
the company policy, exercises the BYOD
provision, he/she has access to newer
technology that said company may not
necessarily have the same access to. Such
technology and benefits thereof, in turn, can be
realized and capitalized upon by the
organization in additional productivity,
streamlined operations and/or enhanced
information technology uses.
Another indirect benefit for the company
would be the absolute need to review existing
policies in order to craft more robust, timely
and appropriate policies in light of BYOD. An
end result could be that additional training
and/or security safeguards would be instituted,
and add a positive benefit to the overall
information technology security standpoint of
the organization. It should be noted, however,
that this list is not an all-inclusive list of the
benefits associated with BYOD. The reasons a
company may employ BYOD could vary
greatly based upon the needs, goals and
financial standing of same. Nevertheless,
companies would most likely benefit from one
or more of the aforementioned items.
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As more companies implement BYOD, Digital
Forensic Examiners (DFE) will encounter a
myriad of legal and policy issues of which they
must be aware. These issues can range from
privacy, 4th Amendment, ownership questions,
liability and other legalities.
3.1 4th Amendment Issues
The 4th Amendment to the Constitution is the
preliminary groundwork to any and all issues
relating to search and seizure of an individual’s
device. The 4th Amendment serves to protect
individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures without due process (i.e., a trial) and a
warrant is generally required to search a
device. The warrant is a legal document that
allows law enforcement to search an area or
item for evidence of the alleged criminal
activity (Nelson, 2010). In general, a warrant
must be sufficiently and specifically worded for
the seizure of the evidence. Once the warrant
is signed by the Judge, it is executed against
the individual and/or property for the items
enumerated in the warrant (and other fruits of
a crime in plain view). Essentially, under the
4th Amendment, a cellphone and computer are
treated as a closed container wherein there is
an inherent expectation of privacy of the data
on said device by the owner. In the absence of
a policy put in place by a corporation or a
properly issued warrant, the 4th Amendment
protections apply (this is a critical point to
remember that will be addressed later on). The
investigator is limited in the kind and amount
of evidence he/she can collect in a BYOD
enterprise by these elements—a policy, Court
Order and/or the warrant. DFEs must be
aware of the context in order not to invalidate
any evidence and open the company up to
potential litigation.
Further solidifying the  4th Amendment
right to privacy, the Supreme Court very
recently reviewed a case regarding the police’s
perceived right to search a cell phone without
a warrant incident to the arrest of the accused.
The Supreme Court ruled in Riley v.
California (2014), that the police may not
search cell phones belonging to suspects
without a warrant and that said devices are
not akin to wallets or vehicles (wherein the
police can do a search after a lawful arrest,
especially if “fruits of the crime” are in plain
view) (Mears, 2014). This is important because
it protects the ownership of the data on the
phone and the device to the owner of same.
The Supreme Court relied upon the 4th
Amendment and the long standing law that
police need a warrant to search one’s home and
that cell phones differ from other objects that
can be searched since they [cell phones] carry
much different items on the person than a
purse (Mears, 2014). Accordingly, the Justice
Department plans to work with law
enforcement to ensure that technology will be
used to preserve the evidence on cell phones
while the cases are pending for a warrant
(Mears, 2014). This is important to the digital
investigator because policies and standards will
have to be developed and enforced in the
corporate environment for consistent
application of this evidence preservation
technique and said investigator will need to
have access and training to any applicable
tools.
Additionally, DFEs need to be aware of
potential exigent circumstances (thus
alleviating the need for a warrant) that may
still exist and there will need to be a consistent
standard for the application of this exception
(Mears, 2014). The DFE must be cognizant of
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any pending warrants/cases for the individual
who owns the subject phone and that any
search of the phone may be deemed
inadmissible if the DFE is seen as any agent of
law enforcement (working in concert with or
under the direction thereof). Proper boundaries
and procedures must be enacted to protect the
DFE and the integrity of the evidence,
especially in this scenario.
3.2 Electronic Communications
Privacy Act
As technology evolves, more relevant [to
BYOD] laws and regulations have been
formulated such as the Stored Communications
Act (hereinafter referred to as “SCA”) as part
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(hereinafter referred to as “ECPA”). ECPA
serves to protect cellular telephone, e-mail and
other electronic data transmissions from
unauthorized search and seizure (and serves to
amend the Federal Wiretap Act) (Spinello,
2011). In particular, the SCA of ECPA serves
to protect a user’s electronic communication
from being viewed, altered or otherwise
interfered with while it is in electronic storage
with an ISP/service provider (internet service
provider) or similar entity. However, there is
no warrant necessity to get communications
from third parties, such as ISPs, etc. This does
not necessarily mean there is not a Court
Order or Subpoena requirement to get the
information from third parties. The DFE must
be cognitive of stored communications and if
he/she should have access of them from
information gleaned from the imaging or if a
formal request to a third party will be
necessary (or if litigation will be needed to get
the information). At this point, the DFE must
cease the capture of the protected third party
information and look for further direction. As
such, on a BYOD device within an
organization, the third party communications
with the party are protected conversations and
the Digital Forensic Examiner may breach
rights of other parties and subject a company
to liability.
3.3 Commingled Data and Stored
Communications Act
Organizations using BYOD should be aware of
potential challenges. Commingled data is one
of the most obvious consequences. Simply
stated, commingled data refers to the
employee’s personal data being mixed in
amongst the business-owned (and/or
proprietary) data. Some examples of
commingled data include but are not limited
to: text messages, photo galleries, email, web
browser history, metadata, and call history.
The commingled data issue is of utmost
importance to the DFE because of the
corporate policy limitations, as well as consent
to search and the challenges to the search that
could be mounted by the employee. In all
fairness, it would be remiss to not at least note
that commingled data (and the problems that
come therewith) are also present in standard
enterprise environments without BYOD.
However, with BYOD, the device ownership
issue along with technology evolution
complicates the digital forensic examiner’s job
significantly. As such, the DFE runs a high
risk of capturing the employee’s personal data
and/or being accused of wrong-doing (such as
inappropriate viewing or accessing). Further,
having the access to an employee’s personal
data is ripe for exploitation if the involved
investigative parties are not scrupulous and
methodical in the collection efforts.
A great example of this sort of commingled
data exploitation is the case of Lazette v.
Kulmatycki, wherein the Plaintiff Lazette was
employee of Defendant’s that was assigned a
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company owned Blackberry mobile device for
use in the scope of her employment. She
[Lazette] used the company owned Blackberry
to access her personal email account that was
linked to said Blackberry (Konvisser, 2013).
When the Plaintiff terminated her
employment, she deleted her personal email
account from the device and returned same to
the personally named Defendant Kulmatycki
(as an agent of the employer). However,
despite her [Plaintiff’s] best efforts to delete
the commingled data, the Defendant recovered
the personal email account off of the device
and read her [Plaintiff’s] private email (hosted
on another, unrelated cloud platform) over the
subsequent months (Konvisser, 2013). Since
the Defendant read these personal emails that
was stored on infrastructure owned by a
provider (such as Google), he was found at
fault under the SCA for the unethical act
(Konvisser, 2013). Further, the employer was
found vicariously liable for the defendant’s
action despite the fact that the device was
owned by the company (Barnes, 2013). The
SCA covers the activities of an individual
intentionally accessing, without authority (or
exceeding granted authority, such as
privilege/access escalation), a facility that
provides an electronic communication service
and/or obtains, alters, or otherwise prevents
authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage
in such a system (Cornell University Law
School, 2015). The punishment ranges from
fines, to imprisonment up to 10 years for
repeated offenses (or a combination of both)
(Cornell University Law School, 2015).
Even in the cases where DFEs have no
intent to abuse their access to the information,
commingled data still looms as a troublesome
pitfall. For example, SMS messages (texts) and
MMS (picture messages) are inherently
commingled on the device, thus, rendering the
collection of them in the same commingled
format. Thus, even if the DFE does not have
the malicious intent to access the information
stored in another location by an electronic
service provider, the DFE may nonetheless
breach SCA by intentionally trying to gather
all information off of the device (thus,
obtaining the other provider may have that
they person accessed on the device) or by
trying to capture other information that leads
to the other provider.
3.4 Common Law
The common law tort known as “the
expectation of privacy” comes into play with a
BYOD enterprise. In evaluating the common
law tort known as the reasonable expectation
of privacy, the court looks to several factors
such as: did the employee have a reasonable
expectation of privacy (consent to monitoring,
private property, etc.), was the monitoring
justified and if there was an emphasis on
minimal intrusion by the employer (Schweik,
1995). The DFE must keep in mind that in
BYOD cases where the corporate policies are
weak, questionable or even non-existent, the
employee may try to assert the expectation of
privacy as an affirmative defense to
surrendering the device (and contents thereof)
for analysis.
3.5 Ownership Issues
Additionally, data and device ownership
questions pose serious issues for the company
as well as any DFE involved in a BYOD
investigation case. Upon termination of the
employee, the question of data and device
ownership and spoliation becomes a factor. In
the case of a company owned device, the
employee typically destroys all of the “personal
data” on the device upon return of same.
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Arguably, since the device was not the
employee’s, likewise all of the data contained
therein did not belong to him or her.
Unfortunately, the employer has no control
over employee’s direct destruction of the data;
however said employer may assert an
ownership claim over the data and the device.
Once all the data is destroyed, it is may be up
to the DFE to recover it with any number of
tools, however, then the data commingling and
exploitation risks become inherent.
However, in the case of BYOD, the
company does not assert ownership against the
device, only some of the data contained
therein. The employee may either wrongfully
destroy or withhold all of the company’s
information on the device upon termination.
Once again, the company is exercising
ownership rights over the data however said
data is housed on a device that said company
has no ownership in. As such, the employee
could successfully delete or disseminate the
data while maintaining the device. The DFE,
in either circumstance, is put in the precarious
position of finding ways to recover the deleted
data and it is highly conceivable that the
device will not be available. The employee
could sue and/or claim that his privacy was
breached and wrongful search and seizure if
the proper policies and procedures are not put
into place.
3.6 Evidence Spoliation
Evidence spoliation can take several forms,
especially in the case of BYOD. A terminated
employee (i.e., a disgruntled employee) may
take any number of actions to make the
company data--and thus, any wrongdoing by
the employee in regards to the company data--
unavailable. For example, in the case of
Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc. v. Michigan
Resin Representatives, the plaintiff’s former
employee was accused of doing wrongdoing in
the course of his employment (Haney, 2013).
The former employee took his commingled
BYOD and promptly turned it into his mobile
service provider and obtained a new cellphone
(Haney, 2013). Since the original cellphone was
not available, the Plaintiff sought the recovery
of a digital image of the defendant’s laptop
computer. During litigation pendency, the
defendant deleted 270,000 files from the laptop
(Haney, 2013). The Court stated that the
Plaintiff incurred extra discovery costs in
trying to obtain the evidence, however it was
not noted whether or not the Plaintiff was able
to recover any of the lost evidence (Haney,
2013). Instead, the Court and Jury were
allowed to infer that the Defendant destroyed
the evidence because he was lying, was
involved in malicious conduct, etc. (Haney,
2013). Another example (admittedly not as
blatant as the previously enumerated example)
of spoliation that may happen in “BYOD”
situations is when a personally owned device is
heavily used, it may over-write some of the
business data (such as text messages or items
in memory). Once again, the company would
have no control over this. The investigator
would be hard pressed to recover the original,
over-written data under these circumstances.
3.7 Inadequate Policies
Noteworthy, another consequence of BYOD is
the very likely possibility of inadequate
organizational policies to cover BYOD issues,
ethical obligations, and conflicting client
expectations with the laws that direct and
dictate the behavior of those conducting the
investigation. For example, the DFE could be
put in the uncomfortable middle position of
whether to “obey” the wishes of the employer
(either direct or contracted employer) within
the scope of an investigation or to follow any
applicable legal regulations and/or subpoenas.
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DFEs will find themselves in this situation
when the Court Order is overly broad and/or
vague. As a result, the DFE must manage the
client’s expectations, in light of the Court
Order and within the realm of laws and
liability. At best it becomes a test of the
DFE’s patience and moral compass as well as
in-depth knowledge of the legal limits.
3.8 Technology
Keeping up with device advances becomes a
major DFE challenge as well. As the devices
become more sophisticated, new mechanisms
are put into place to “safeguard” the
consumer’s data. For example, many current
device manufacturers deploy default encryption
on the devices to prevent the theft of the data.
These safeguards may be insurmountable by
the DFE and make it impossible to gather the
image or data in a complete state (if at all). In
the case of Apple device encryption, the
investigator can get Apple involved, however
anytime a third party is involved, more
chances for tainted and incomplete evidence
exists. Further, Apple has recently stated it
will not release any encryption keys and/or
perform any analysis on devices with passcode
locked iOS8.0 devices (Apple, 2014). For any
documents stored in the iCloud that are
encrypted, Apple has stated it will not release
any keys (Apple, 2014).
In the case of a Blackberry and/or Android
device encryption or security mechanisms, the
investigator can possibly pull the chip data
(binary file) in the absence of the pin code
(Hunter, 2014). Further, it is not illegal to date
for manufacturers to deploy these products on
devices despite law enforcement pleas to the
contrary.
In order to balance the need with
encryption and the need for organizational
data access,  some device manufacturers (such
as Apple) have devised a program that allows
one computer to have the complete
administrative control and syncing abilities for
any number of deployed enterprise devices.
The controlled devices are configured to be
controlled by the administrative machine via
the use of the administrative device’s MAC
address (media access control address) and the
device UID. One such program is known as
Apple Configurator.
Apple Configurator has the ability to do
any number of tasks and settings, such as
setting the lock screen, wallpaper and name,
controlling installed apps and documents,
setting configuration profiles, integrating with
Mobile Device Management solutions and
applying updates (Apple, Inc., 2014). While
taken at face value, the Configurator seems
like a great feature, this is not necessarily the
case for the DFE. Per Forensic Analyst and
Instructor Bruce Hunter of BlackBag
Technologies, one of the major problems he
encounters on a regular basis with the
Configurator is the inability to dump the
information from the suspect machine since it
is linked to an administrator/supervisor
machine (Hunter, 2014). The consequence of
this application usage is that the “investigated
device” is unable to connect to the forensic
workstation (Hunter, 2014). The glaring
detriment of having the administrator
computer “in charge” of all syncing and
“dumps” is what happens in the case wherein
the DEF does not have access to the
administrative computer and/or one of the
suspect computers is the administrator
computer? Such a scenario could render the
DFE without any recourse or method to copy
or dump the device to the forensic workstation.
The DFE and organizations must keep
abreast and aware of the technology changes
that are coming into play. For example, smart
watches (such as the Apple Watch and other
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models of the like) are an up and coming
trend. These devices carry a whole host of
issues for a DFE and organization to grasp.
For example, these items are even more
portable and concealable than a smart phone,
tablet or laptop. Hence, the theft of this device
in an immediate fashion is easy.  Further, since
these devices are so new, there are not many
applications out there that the DFE can use to
grapple with the data. Hence, the DFE is
limited to what they are able to retrieve from
the device. What’s more, is the inherent
characteristics of the device make it a prime
target for commingled data in so that is used
for many personal transactions, such as fitness
monitoring (logs heartrate amongst other
personal health factors), wallet and credit card
transactions, photos, location information,
GPS and tracking of the individual wearing
the watch. The DFE would encounter all of
this private information in an investigation.
The watch raises many security concerns
including the use of Bluetooth (easy to hack
and eavesdrop) in addition to Wi-Fi.
Further, the DFE may have a hard time
retrieving instant messages sent on the watch,
depending on the amount of storage. For
example, the Apple watch allows its users to
send sketches and instant messages—this could
become key in a case where trade secrets are
stolen.
3.9 Third Party Applications and
Services
The influx of cloud services and third party
applications can cause issues in a BYOD
environment and make it difficult for a DFE to
conduct the investigation. Cloud applications
have some legitimate uses such as for
document and photo storage, virtual
environments, disaster recovery and/or backup
purposes (e.g., Dropbox, iCloud, etc.).
Organizational information may be stored or
encrypted in a cloud or in another third party
application (such as LinkedIn, Facebook, etc.)
to the detriment of the enterprise with the
BYOD usage. For example, many personal
device users knowingly or unknowingly back
up their data to a cloud by the virtue of a
checkbox selected when the cell phone or
tablet is set up (or the device sends it to the
cloud automatically for the “convenience” of
the consumer) (Manes, 2013). As the company
has no control over any manufacturer
proprietary cloud or third party applications,
the courts would have to be involved (despite
any policy put in place by the company). The
enterprise IT team must be cognizant of
confidentiality and privilege issues that may
exist within the enterprise and realize that
these responsibilities may be compromised in a
BYOD situation through the use of cloud and
other applications (this also includes
Personally Identifiable Information spills)
(Manes, 2013). Furthermore, the company
would have no control over the uses of the
data (e.g., Data mining, marketing, theft) and
would have to seek an injunction after the
damage has been done.
Of course there are no guarantees of
successful litigation in a BYOD situation
dealing with outside vendors and/or third
parties. In this scenario, the DFE will need to
testify in court as to what files he/she wishes
to recover and how same are relevant. It is
highly probable that the DFE will miss
evidence and/or not be aware of all of the
contents backed up or contained or even
encrypted within the application. In the case
wherein the data between the device and
application is encrypted, that data would be
unrecoverable. Additionally, some applications
may even be hidden, disguised or disabled,
thus making it harder for the DFE (by limiting
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or hiding other items, tasks) to have a grasp
on what data exists (BlackBag Training Team,
2012).
Lastly, the employee may knowingly back
up information to a cloud services provider
and/or third party (social media, etc.) with
reckless abandon (such as in sabotage, etc.)
and ignorance to the consequences that may
come to the company. The employee may be
ill-informed, ignorant or simply not care if
company information is stored at these other
locations (or sadly, may actually think they
are doing the company ‘a favor by backing up’
the data).
3.10 Manufacturer Backdoors
Another security element that has to be taken
into account by an organization and a DFE is
the possibility of the manufacturer of the
device having a backdoor installed on the
device. In concert with the typical security
concerns with backdoors, same [backdoors]
carry the potential for evidence to be changed,
altered, deleted and/or stolen by an outside
party that learns how to use the backdoor. At
the minimum, data (private, company data) on
a BYOD could be sent to the device
manufacturer via usage of the backdoor. An
example of such a backdoor has come to light
and is alleged with Apple products. Please
note, the authors are not proving or disproving
these allegations, just what has been asserted
by other professionals in the field. The
following backdoor programs have been found
on Apple products as of July 2014 by




2014). Apple has asserted that these packet
capturing, copying and transferring accesses
are there for troubleshooting, support and
diagnostic purposes and are not backdoors for
nefarious purposes (O’Grady, 2014). Another
company accused of installing backdoors on
their products is Google (Ossowski, 2014).
Further, to prevent against access via
manufacturer backdoors, it may actually serve
as an impediment to the DFE. For example,
with the Apple backdoor issues alleged earlier,
the following solution has been proposed in the
industry (other than Apple removing these
files): set a complex passcode in iOS, use the
Apple Configurator product discussed in this
article to set up the Mobile Device
Management restrictions and enable pair
locking (Hodgkins, 2014). While this blocks
third-party forensics applications (sorry, DFE),
Apple will still be able to do a forensic
examination on it which can hinder an





As with most technology and organization
challenges, Digital Forensic Investigators will
find no one silver bullet to fix the pitfalls that
plague investigations in the BYOD arena. An
oversimplified approach is to simply remain
completely educated and flexible in his/her
approach to the BYOD issues and mobile
forensics, but this is no small task in itself.
Instead, the authors offer the major issues that
must be considered and addressed.
4.1 Address Commingled Data
Commingled data must be addressed in an
organized manner while adhering to the
prevailing regulatory documents (Court
Orders, Corporate Policies). While it is true
that it can be difficult to sift through the data
to determine what is business vs. personal
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data, DFEs must demonstrate due diligence.
Some investigators may subscribe to the belief
that they should make a copy of all of the data
on the device without searching same,
however, one could argue that there would be
potential liability concerns for accessing all of
the data (under SCA, privacy laws in absence
of company waiver, etc.) if a bitwise copy has
been made. How the DFE decides to handle
the commingled data is up to the company and
the investigator (and any applicable
employment contracts) in light of any Court
Order.
4.2 Implement Mobile Device
Management
Many companies use mobile device
management (hereinafter referred to as
“MDM”). Historically these management
applications are not able to make a distinction
between personal and corporate data
(McGrath, 2014). In response to this issue,
some vendors have designed applications that
work to secure the data itself (not so much the
device) and offer them under the category of
mobile application management (hereinafter
referred to as “MAM”) (McGrath, 2014). Many
of these devices include a “virtual
infrastructure” such as “virtual silos” for the
data on BYOD. If a company uses MAM—
either in totality or piecemealed—it can help
to sort out the data, but not prevent all
commingled data. For example,   Blackberry
10 devices provide two desktops—personal and
work--that do not talk to one another
(although texts may still be commingled)
(Hunter, 2014). Another example is the
chamber concept that is used by Windows
Phone and Surface (chambers isolate data).
There are other vendors, such as Citrix, that
also rely on the zone/container/chambers
model for products.
It should be noted; however, all MDM and
MAM products should not be completely relied
upon, as they do not always resolve ever-
changing BYOD issues. Some products have
attempted to meet the needs of enterprises
deploying BYOD to include tools such as
remote wiping and partitioning (likely
analogous to the MAM virtual silos) (DiMarco,
2013). While one may think that MAM and
MDM products may be the BYOD solution,
said products are not able to be configured
(and therefore the enterprise may not be able
to control) for devices with non-traditional
operating systems and or “jail broken” devices
running modified systems (Gatewood, 2012).
Either way, the use of these products may
help contain some, but not all, of the data in
appropriate compartments and simplify the
process of the forensic copying. By the use of a
MAM or MDM, the BYOD may be limited in
the usage of a cloud service and/or other
applications. If the use of these other
applications is limited and/or prevented, it can
help narrow the scope of the data for the DFE
review and also assist in limiting the amount of
proprietary corporate data that is leaked out.
The aforementioned Apple product that allows
all devices to be configured to one
administrator device is a form of proprietary,
vendor specific MDM. Further, Apple has also
instituted encryption and activation locks on
its mobile devices to help prevent theft of data
if a device is activated as a “stolen” device.
This could be useful in the case wherein a
BYOD is an Apple device with critical,
sensitive information on it.  It is imperative to
note that, at a minimum, a BYOD
environment must have managed data,
environments and encryption incorporated
within a MAM and MDM.
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4.3 Limit or Sandbox Important
Mobile Applications
Of course, in a BYOD scenario the device
owner may dispute the limiting of applications
on the device. It is likely that the device owner
would be successful as the Courts routinely
look at the ownership of the device as the
controlling factor. It may be worthwhile for a
company to narrowly craft a policy that would
justify the limitation of a certain application
instead of a blanket limitation on any non-
enterprise owned applications. Further, many
issues would need to be addressed by adequate
policies such as ownership of data and the
device to help prevent spoliation of the
evidence.
The enterprise must retain the right to
remote wipe the device, regardless of the
device ownership and have a mechanism in
place to prevent the employee from engaging
in remote wiping (such as if the device was
confiscated from the employee and he/she
desires to delete text messages). In addition, in
an investigation, the enterprise should make
sure to send a preservation notice to the
investigated party to not destroy any of the
data (or device) and copy the applicable
investigator on same to give notice (and to also
alert the investigator to the action and possible
destruction of data). This will help preserve
any challenges in Court if the device and/or
data become subject to spoliation litigation.
4.4 Educate Employers
Another item that may assist the DFE in the
long term is to educate the employers/clients
on the legal and investigatory issues that
surround the forensic collection of the data in a
BYOD environment. While education is always
a positive benefit, it by no means is a complete
solution. In MAM and MDM deployments,
education is a necessity due to the staff
integration that must take place. Bruce Hunter
summed this need up well in his description of
“management devices make it a minefield…
[You] must have the IT person on board to
help you [investigator] navigate through”
(Hunter, 2014).
Further, the employer should and must
consult with a security expert to determine
which BYOD products in the future are ‘safer’
bets than others. Some devices, such as the
watch and even smart cars (in the making),
may prove, in fact to be too risky even for the
most prepared organization.
4.5 Formulate Policy
We cannot stress enough the importance of
strong policies to assist the DFE in a BYOD
investigation. Absent Court Orders and/or
Warrants, organizational policy dictates the
rights that an investigator has to the device
and data. Moreover all policies must comply
with any applicable Court Orders and that
said Order is prevailing over any contradicting
policy. Organizations should note that there
are certain elements that must be covered by
the organizational policy such as notice to the
employee that he/she does not have a complete
expectation of privacy on the device containing
company data, regardless of ownership of the
device (to defeat 4th Amendment violation
claims).
Further, the policies should include the
consent for the capture of all text messages
and photos as it alleviates the DFE's burden
when attempting to sort through these items.
The policy must be clearly defined, posted and
should detail such provisions as: employer has
access to text messages and photos, employer
may remote wipe under specific circumstances
(such as theft, loss, commingled data, etc.),
employer can investigate at any time, that the
employee gives informed consent, regulations
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on confidential trade secret information, policy
parameters to protect client confidentiality,
acceptable use provisions (i.e., an approved
application listing), security and monitoring
measures engaged in by the enterprise, etc.
(Hinkes, 2014). This policy should be signed by
the organization and the employee prior to the
employee starting to engage in work for said
organization or having his/her device accessing
work product.
Additionally, the employer can have the
policy drafted in such a way to attempt to
prevent any SCA claims. The SCA provides
that, “whoever intentionally accesses without
authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is
provided…and thereby obtains, alters or
prevents authorizes access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage... shall be punished as
provided…” (Barnes, 2013). As such, this
would apply to email stored somewhere else
(such as with Google, etc. or in another data
center) and could open up the DFE to liability
if he/she accesses email or other stored photos,
text messages, etc. As a work around, SCA
does allow for third party access to
communication when the consent is provided
by the user (Barnes, 2013). As such, if consent
is given within the policy parameters by the
user to access text messages, stored documents
and photos, this will likely insulate the DFE




5.1 Roles and Responsibilities of
Policy
Even with all the challenges and potential
pitfalls with a BYOD environment, the authors
envision more companies taking this approach
because of the benefits. Once the decision to
move in the direction of BYOD has been
made, the first step is to start planning and
create policies. Although the authors cannot
offer specific wording due to the myriad of
organizational environments, there are basic
concepts that must be in place.
Corporate policies play a substantial role in
how employees as well as the Digital Forensic
Examiner will handle and react within the
BYOD environment. First and foremost in the
absence of any policy, the new policy must
clearly establish that the employee (regardless
of device ownership) does not have an
expectation of privacy on the device in regards
to the corporate information contained therein.
The language in the contract should encompass
both statutory and common law expectation of
privacy claims (i.e., there is no inherent right
to privacy with the phone as employee is
waiving that right, consent to monitoring,
etc.). The company should also include
provisions that there is no expectation of
privacy in regards to the commingled data,
text and photo messages in particular.
Further, a company must protect itself via
the use of a policy against SCA claims. As
previously mentioned, the company policy
should also encompass and detail that the
employee (user) is granting third party access
to the stored communications to the employer
and waive any action under the SCA. The
policy should clearly state under what
circumstances monitoring and searching of the
device may take place and that the company
does not search and review arbitrarily—there
must be a legitimate need for same.
Along the same lines, the policy must
clearly and unequivocally state what the
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acceptable use provisions are for the BYOD in
the enterprise environment. The Acceptable
Use provisions can include, but not be limited
by, such elements as: acceptable use of
applications (including third-party and cloud
applications), what type of websites can be
viewed or associated with the company data,
duty to protect the device and company data
stored therein, prevention of commingling of
data, just to name a few.
Other practical aspects of the policy and
BYOD element must be addressed in the
policy, such as storage of company information
on the device, password and encryption
requirements, reimbursement plans, the
requirement to give any a passwords or access
tokens to the company, as well as the loss, sale
or trade in of the device, etc. The employee
should sign a release, consent to policy and any
applicable waivers prior to instituting the
BYOD plan.
On the company side, the following
internal elements should be addressed prior to
permitting the use of BYOD: allocation of IT
help desk and other support for BYOD, what
sort of support and overhead will be dedicated
to BYOD, procedure for device retrieval and
legal preservation (in the case of either a
terminated employee or a legal hold), resources
and company system permissions, consequences
for non-compliance, training on proper BYOD
security and security best practices required by
the company and overall awareness training for
all stakeholders (Gatewood, 2012). In addition,
the company must take into account the
specific privacy, accountability and reporting
concerns that are associated with its industry,
such as HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley, Gramm-
Leach, just to name a few. The policy must
cover what is to be conducted on the devices
and how the information is to be handled by
the employee and the company in a BYOD
environment to protect the organization from
liability.
6. CONCLUSION
BYOD is a trend that will increase in
popularity as more employees want to bring
the latest device to work. Organizations will
continue to adopt a BYOD mindset as it offers
them perceived potential costs savings with
increases in employee satisfaction. Although it
would be more secure to not create BYOD
environments, current trends suggest that this
is a losing battle.
We would caution those organizations who
are planning on implementing BYOD to
consider the potential policy, as well as other
infrastructure changes to protect against
comingled data, lost devices, etc. For those
organization already in a BYOD environment
do look to mitigate considering many of the
items and approaches we have suggested.
Remember that there will be pitfalls and
potential litigation issues that could obliterate
any realized savings by the company. In
addition, the DFE is disadvantaged in a
BYOD scenario because of the device diversity,
third party applications storage potential and
legal ramifications that are evitable. Further,
as evidenced above, there is no single
mitigation solution to address these issues in
order to protect an enterprise (and do not
forget the clients as well) in a BYOD situation.
Further, in an ordinary situation, difficult for
an enterprise to have a complete grasp on
trade secrets and other confidential
information. A BYOD scenario would
compromise the enterprise and would make it
even more difficult for the enterprise to
navigate through the technology advances and
investigations in light of the numerous issues
such as device ownership, portability, third
party stakes, legal protections, etc.
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Until these issues can be mitigated further
and more easily managed by an investigator, a
company should tread the BYOD waters with
great caution as a remedy may be hard to find.
We recommend strong policies, procedures,
and education as the best approach at this
point in time.
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